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SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE 
FOUNDING PERIOD. By Gerhard Casper.1 Harvard 
University Press. 1997. Hardcover, 202 pages. $27.00. 
Robert I. Delahuntl 
This little book is offered as a group of "essays and claim[ s] 
to be no more." (p. 6) It consists of a series of chapters outlin-
ing the evolution of the concept of separation of powers before 
and during the period of the Constitution's framing, and de-
scribing the practical problems that Congress and the Executive 
encountered during the Washington and Jefferson Administra-
tions in applying it. The book's main finding is that there was no 
"coherent and generally shared idea of separation of pow-
ers .... No consensus existed as to the precise institutional ar-
rangements that would satisfy the requirements of the doctrine. 
The only matter on which agreement existed was what it meant 
not to have separation of powers: it meant tyranny." (p. 18; 22} 
It is fair to say that the author makes out a convincing case for 
that (rather modest) claim. 
The central and most useful chapters guide us through ear-
lier efforts to work out an acceptable understanding of the 
proper roles and functions of the Federal branches. Some of 
these episodes involved conflict between the branches (as in the 
House of Representatives' investigation of the defeat of General 
St. Clair's army in an Indian campaign in 1791, which gave rise 
to the claim of "executive privilege"; (pp. 28-32)) in other epi-
sodes, the branches arrived at an agreed distribution of powers 
with a minimum of difficulty (as in the First Congress's decision 
to place the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War squarely 
within the Executive branch (p. 42)) .. The process reveals the 
branches experimenting with particular arrangements, discard-
1. President, Stanford University. 
2. Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. The 
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209 
210 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 15:209 
ing them for reasons of doctrine, efficiency, or partisanship, and 
then returning to them again-as in the struggle between Feder-
alists and Republicans over whether appropriations should be 
made in lump sums (and thus delegate broad discretion to the 
Executive), or with specificity (so as to ensure legislative su-
premacy). (pp. 79-93) Interestingly, the branches occasionally 
reached understandings that differ sharply from those now 
prevalent: for example, it seemed unproblematic to Washington 
that the Senate, and even in some cases the House, should play a 
role in advising the President about the negotiation of treaties. 
(pp. 51-55) 
Engaging and informative as these essays often are, one is 
left to wonder what, in the end, Casper has taught us. Holmes 
insisted long ago that in separating powers, the Constitution 
"do[es] not establish and divide fields of black and white."3 
More recently, Philip Kurland,4 in an article that Casper ac-
knowledges, probed and developed Holmes's insight, finding it 
anticipated by Madison. Casper provides corroboration and de-
tail for this idea. But his book lacks the range, power and bleak 
pessimism of Kurland's magnificent article. Read Casper for 
the early history of separation of powers. But read Kurland for 
the causes, and likely consequences, of its decay. 
3. Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
4. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 
85 Mich. L. Rev. 592 (1986). 
